Thank you.

Now, you'll have to give me the date today. I get on this automatic outflow of giving you the date.

Audience: The 29th.

The 29th? But, what year?

Audience: AD 11.

That's the right year; AD 11.

All right. 29 June, AD 11, and here we go with the Saint Hill Briefing Course, and boy, I tell you, how do you manage? I mean to say, how do you manage?

Anyway, I gave a talk earlier, which some of you heard, about wrong target — wrong target. And I've said since 1947, really-and you'll find it in The Original Thesis-the auditor plus the pc's analytical mind versus the reactive mind, tsk! you win. The pc versus his own reactive mind, nyaaah. The auditor versus the pc analytical mind, nyaaa-ah. It takes the auditor and the pc's analytical mind to whip the pc's reactive mind.

Did you ever see any — any steam locomotives or electric locomotives, or so forth, go over to a — a grade? They keep hooking locomotives on, you know? They can't pull the slope up to the high hills of Birmingham or something, so they put an extra locomotive on. Did you ever see anybody do that? Did you ever hear of that?

All right. That's the same thing as auditing is. You're hooking on an extra locomotive. But why? Why, hmm? Why would you hook on an extra locomotive? Well, it's because the locomotive that is on the train can't make it. It's one of these horribly obvious things, see? The locomotive that's on the train can't pull the grade, so you hook another locomotive on and they pull the grade.

All right. As long as your target is the pc's analytical mind, you're not going to win. If you're trying to clear his analytical mind, it will take you 75 hours to do a Security Check, 295 hours to do an SOP Goals Assessment. You get the idea? I mean, Scientology will work even in spite of that. If you want to know what the drag factor is, it's just that one. Wrong target.

I had a letter from Peter Williams today. He's halfway round the bend. That's pretty good for a Clear. That's where the auditors have got him. He can't figure out what they're doing. See? I mean, he can't figure out what they're doing, you know?

Well, I've had lots of experience. I can always figure out what you're doing — not only figure out the human mind, you have to figure out what the auditor's doing. Because, in all honesty and in all decency and trying like mad and through no willfulness on his own part, he gets the wrong curve on something, and all of a sudden this fantastic amount of time begins to occur. Tremendous amounts of auditing begin to elapse. Processes which would ordinarily work don't work. Well, what's wrong? What's wrong? There's a breakdown here in understanding of some kind or another whenever this occurs. You see that?

All right. Williams had a tremendously successful course. He made a Clear. He made a couple of them, as a matter of fact, down in Australia. And it was no small feat. He was doing fine, and all of a sudden I get a despatch from him today, and he's going, "Wha — well, I'd almost lost hope and then I got one of your tapes and I'm going in again, and so forth, but this exact...."

I got a telex today from London. And Herbie says that the auditors can't get any Sec Checking done in running Routine 1 because it's taking them two and three hours to clear the rudiments. Well, all right. There's another one — just a curve, misapplication. But it's a very simple thing He's asking me for an extraordinary solution, which is wipe out the rudiments on the Model Session used for Sec Checking, or at least wipe out part of them. That's an extraordinary solution. See? You get driven to the wall, think of an extraordinary solution and the next thing you know you're not doing Scientology. You got the idea? That's the ordinary course of human events.

Now, Ken was asking me yesterday about how do you spot — do troubleshooting. And I told him the first big, big pinnacle here of trouble-shooting was what the hell is going on? I mean, that's the big one, you know? Because there you're up against a tremendous amount of alter-is and counter-create. People are trying hard. They're not being vicious about it. They are understanding it to the best of their ability, and so forth.

All right. You're in the same situation when you're doing something like that that I was with — in with regard to life when I was trying to figure this thing out, see?

Here's life with this tremendous facade of the super-mystery and how you mustn't penetrate it and you can't and all of this sort of thing, you see? And just wasn't anything you could do about it, and all of these weird propositions. Well, that's because there's so doggone much alter-is and so darn much counter-create that the truth of what life was all about had been totally obscured. You got the idea?

So naturally, in relaying a communication about the simplicities of life, these things get restimulated, and people begin to look around corners, you know, when actually the cop is standing right in the middle of the sidewalk. So they go and peer around the corner, and they look up and down alleys, and they come back and forth to look up and down the road, and then turn around and bump into the cop. He's been there all the time. Just failure to observe some fundamental.

So don't feel bad if you do this sort of thing, because, look, I've been over this ground. I can tell you that I did it constantly and continually. That's what life was doing in trying to sort out any of its secrets. They weren't secrets. They were obfuscations. There is no secret about life. It is just the fact that life is surrounded by alter-is and obfuscations to such a degree that you can't see life.

You know, the fellow can't get his job done because there are so many other things to do. This is rather typical. You find this in organizations. You look around and you say, "Now, look, we want the halls clean." Something elementary. "Want the halls clean, you see? And want the place to look nice, you know — public come in and all that." And the fellow has been hired just to clean the halls, you see? And there he is cleaning the halls, and — you think — and you come in one morning and you wade through the dust over your shoe soles, you see? And the next morning it's over your toes, and the next morning it's around your petticoats, and the next morning it's getting around the waist. You can hardly get into the joint, you see, for scrap paper. And you finally say, "What the hell is going on here? We have a fellow who is supposed to be cleaning halls. Well, what's he doing?"

And you ask him, "What are you doing?"

"Well, I can't do that. I haven't got time to do that."

';But that is your job."

"Yeah, but I haven't got time to do that."

"Well, what's happening?"

"Well, actually, I have to run all these errands and I have to mail, and I have to this and I have to that."

And you say, "Mail? What are you talking about? We have a man over in the mail room that's supposed to take care of mail."

"Yeah, I know, but he's so busy addressing and stamping."

"Now, look, we've got somebody over in the — in the — in the Address Department that's supposed to be addressing and stamping and . . ."

"Well, yes."

And you go over to the Address Department and you say, "Why aren't you addressing and stamping?"

And they say, "Well, we just have to clean these halls, and we . . ."

You see? Data starts breaking down, you see? And it goes into a concatenation. And the first thing you know, nobody can do his job because he's too busy. And then you don't have any organization, you see? And it's pretty wild when you look at it that way.

So that's what happens when you try to relay or communicate data about life. Life is sort of like that, you know?

The government today is doing basically the work of charity organizations. Well, they are. That's what socialism is. Socialism is that perversion of government to a point where all social activities and charity activities are undertaken by the government, you see? And they don't do any governing. Try to get a suit tried. It'll cost you ten thousand pounds, and it'll take you about two or three years, and so forth. But now, wait a minute. That's the business of government: justice.

You try to walk down Soho about three o'clock in the morning and come out of it unscathed right in the middle of London. That's a rather adventurous undertaking — not as bad as it was perhaps, but it's fairly adventurous even yet.

Well, what happens? Why? Well, the government is so busy being a social worker, you see? It hasn't any time to arrest anybody or take care of the law. Get the idea? Can't — can't round up criminals.

Well, why can't it round up criminals? Well, because they have to send them to jail. What has sending them to jail got to do with handling crime? "Well, we're not quite sure, but that's the way it's done. But of course, we can't send them to jail, because as soon as we try to send them to jail. . ." (This is Washington, DC which has the highest crime rate, I think, in the world, including Port Said, right now.)

You see, that's an interesting comment on a government, you know? I mean, that its capital city has the world's highest crime rate. That's really getting there, you know? Here's the center of law and order which has the world's highest crime rate. Fantastic! You can't get the cops over there to arrest anybody. They won't arrest anybody. And the reason they won't arrest anybody is the people "bug out." And "bug out" is a new cop piece of slang meaning: they go up, they get sentenced to St. Elizabeth by reason of insanity, you see? They parked overtime by reason of insanity, you see, and the judge — psychiatrist rushes in, rushes him over to St. Elizabeth's. They spend a few days in St. Elizabeth's and they're released without any punishment at all. And the cops have gotten to a point where they just won't do their job, that's all. Why? That's because the government is so deeply enmeshed in social work that it hasn't any time to govern, you see?

Now, it isn't that the government is accomplishing government with social work. Actually, it isn't. Because in a good government, production rises, the people are more prosperous. Various other things are always attendant to good government. And yet none of these things are occurring. That's because the government is so busy doing something else.

The government is attacking everybody who produces, which is an interesting thing for a government to do. Just get in business and you'll find the government setting up the Lewis machine guns on your doorstep, see? I don't care whether you're putting yourself into a business of fixin' shoes or fixin' skulls. Same thing.

All right. This is the off-postness of it. It's all off post. Get the idea? Well, where you're living in a world where nearly everything is off post, everything is trying to force you to wear its hat. You see? And if you didn't watch it, you'd simply inherit all the hats there were. And for instance, if we didn't watch it, in the course of the next two decades, we would be wearing the hat called government, particularly if I continue to keep overts going against it. And that isn't my job. And it isn't anybody else's job around here, you see? But here's — here's the thing. I mean, everybody wants you to wear his hat. And you're wearing everybody else's hats, and so on.

All right. Now, let's see how we can short-circuit this so we didn't keep getting off the groove. And that is to say, in an HGC or an auditing team or any activity in Scientology, the person who is on the ground observes. A person who is on the ground observes. Don't ask other people who are off the ground to do your observation for you.

I love Herbie dearly, but to send me a telex. . . Yes, he's in trouble, but he didn't observe. He didn't go down and look. He couldn't have. He leaves me in a position where I have to surmise, you see, what he's doing. And because he hasn't looked, then I sort of interiorize into his hat. You see, he sort of — he yanks my anchor points out thirty-nine miles. Get the idea? And then I have to figure out. Well, I can by experience, fortunately for him. But I have to figure out what his auditor is doing. See? What are they doing that's taking two or three hours?

Well, in the first place, innumerable mistakes are being made. The first is that a person on Routine 1 is not supposed to respond particularly, or is not expected to respond particularly to think processes. And you're going to run two or three hours of think processes on somebody instead of doing a Security Check and CCHs, you see? That's kind of silly in the first place.

Well, the basic mistake which they are making is a simple one. They're just running the rudiments with the sensitivity knob too high. See, they're not clearing the rudiments for a third-of-a-dial drop. They're clearing the rudiments for 16. And because they're doing Security Checks, then they think they should clear the rudiments for a Security Check at 16, but then they never get around to a Security Check.

You know, do the Security Check, by all means, with an abnormally high sensitivity, and check it all out with the sensitivity at 16, by all means. But that hasn't anything to do with the rudiments, see, of running the Model Session in which a Security Check is going to be done. And you set it for a third-of-a-dial drop, and this is about the way you would run rudiments on somebody who is going through CCHs — which will run rudiments faster, by the way, than any rudiments process you've got.

You say, "All right. Is it all right with you to begin the session now?

Good. Is it all right to audit in this room? Fine. Is it all right if I audit you?

All right, that's good. Have you got any ARC breaks? That's fine. Are you withholding anything? Good. Fine. That's good. Do you have any present time problems? Oh, yes, you do. All right. Well, thank you very much. Now, we're going to begin this Security Check."

It's just practicality, that's all. You've gone through all the motions.

'Cause look, you're going to be back on the CCHs, and oddly enough, if you really want to try it sometime, you can run a present time problem with TR 10. That's right. Just say, "Notice that wall. Now notice that ceiling. Notice that floor." The guy is very upset because his wife is going to kiss somebody else, and he hasn't been kissing her for years, and he's wondering why. And you say, "Notice that ceiling. Notice that floor. Notice that wall," and so on.

And the guy says — "Well, now how do you feel about your wife?"

"Well, it's all right. That's pretty bad."

"All right," you say, "Notice that door. Notice your auditor. Notice the chair. Notice the ceiling. Notice the floor. Notice the wall. Notice that picture over there. All right. How do you feel about your wife now?"

"Well, not so bad."

"All right. Good. Notice that ceiling. Now, notice the floor. Notice the wall."

That sounds like a funny way to run a PT problem, doesn't it? And yet it'll work.

All right. You can run an ARC break the same way, unless the ARC break is so violent with you, the auditor, that he won't do the auditing command. You could get into something kind of like that. So you possibly, in doing the CCHs sometime or another — it's rare, very rare — but you might have to run some TR 5N or something like this while bridging over into a Security Check. You got so many ARC breaks with the pc that it's better if you run ten minutes worth of 6N, see — TR 5N. But it's just wasting time, you see?

I mean, basically, the CCHs for sure will run all the rudiments. The CCHs are senior as processes to all or any rudiments process. That's for sure.

So on that, all by yourself, well, you could see that this is the — that the thing would all shake out in the wash anyway. And then look at your — your Security Check. Don't you suppose that's a bit superior to rudiments?

Well, rudiments are just rudiments for heaven sakes. And when you're running a think process, you'd better have them awful straight. Third-of-a-dial drop. Does the rudiment register on the needle? No registry on the needle at a third-of-a-dial-drop sensitivity setting? Leave it alone. Do you understand? and clear it only back to a third-of-a-dial drop — and then you've got speed.

Now, I wasn't giving you a lecture on this particular subject. I'm giving you an example here, that observation should have been done on the ground, see? Then we could have figured out what they were doing instead of getting some extraordinary solution.

Here's the next one that's of considerable importance here. This idea of the analytical mind. We say the analytical mind is kind of a misnomer, because most people think it's some kind of a computing machine. And it's not. It's just the pc. It was a mistake made in early Dianetics in research. There was something there doing a lot of thinking and computing, and so I called it the analytical mind to differentiate this, because at that time we didn't know anything much about thetans. You got the idea?

All right. We mean the thetan. Now, when he directly, personally — what is conscious of a thetan and the attention units available there — are attacked by the auditor, you're going to get no auditing done. Your target is the reactive mind. It is auditor plus pc versus the reactive mind. And boy, now have you really got it plowing. This basically accounts for that five hour-twenty-five hour ratio that's been a kind of a bug to us. Works like this.

As a matter of fact, Julia was the one who made this observation. She was doing a bunch of tests out in Phoenix, and I was taking on pcs, and I was auditing pcs five-hour intensives, see? And I had a whole bunch of pcs one after the other at five-hour intensives, see? And the days and weeks went by and Julia got ahold of a whole bunch of profiles. And they were the — what was not then the guidance center, but the staff auditor profiles, you see, for the same period of time, you know? And here was the five hours and here was the twenty-five hours. And they were the same results, you know?

And she got ahold of this and she pointed this out to me. And there they all sat in the files. And this was rather fascinating. I was getting results in five hours and they were getting results in twenty-five hours, but we were really running more or less the same thing.

Well, when you see a wild variable of this character, don't assign it, as most people would in their overweening conceit, pomp and prejudice to how good they are, see? Any time you say, "Well, the reason there's a big difference is I'm just good, and they're lousy, you see?" That would be a wonderful way to block off any further information on the subject.

Well, truthfully speaking, where you have all of your auditors working like mad, putting in time, doing the same thing as anybody else, you're working like mad putting in time; there must be something different. I didn't discover it actually till a couple or three weeks ago what the dickens this was all about. Their reactive mind was apparently choosing out the pc as the randomity. Got the idea?

In other words, they were auditing the analytical mind. They were auditing the pc, see. They were thinking of the pc as being aberrated, and the pc was this and the pc was that, don't you see? Well, of course, this is true, but it isn't something you attack. See, don't attack the pc; attack his bank. Get this vast difference. Your target is the reactive mind.

Now, I gave you a talk about this not too long ago. And here it comes up again. We haven't got this point yet.

It is a big point. It is not a little tiny niggardly point. It's a big point. It was enough to make this five-twenty-five hour difference.

All right. So therefore, it's probably enough to account for doing a Security Check in 75 hours or doing an SOP Goals in 225 hour assessment, see? See, that all by itself. It's just that one little mechanic that stretches out, this tremendous well, you might call it waste of auditing time. Now, if you could just correct this one little thing and save four out of every five hours of auditing, hey, that'd be pretty good, wouldn't it? That'd be quite a discovery to discover something that was that much. And yet, I discovered this a few weeks ago, and I evidently haven't communicated it, because you're still doing it. You see? To some degree, you're still doing this thing.

What do I mean by this? What do I mean by this? (I know Mary Sue has covered this with you, but I'm going to really slam it home here.) You take an E-Meter, and you look at the E-Meter, and you say, "Have you ever stolen anything?" Now wait. This is the first time you've asked the guy the question, see? You know? "Have you ever stolen anything? Oh, you have, huh. Oh, well, what do you know about that? Well, hmm. All right."

Pc possibly is saying, "Yes, I once stole eight apples and I robbed a store and so forth." And he's saying this; you don't pay any attention to that. That's completely aside and has nothing to do with you.

You say — and you say, "Well, all right. I'll repeat the question again." Clause 16, Auditor's Code: Stay in two-way comm with the pc. Gong! But why?

You're suspecting the pc of having stolen something. You're not trying to find ways and means of getting him to recall, ventilate, air and get the dry rot out of the reactive bank. You're assuming that he knew all about it and has been walking up and down the streets all these years knowing very well that he has stolen everything, and he knows it, and he did it. You got the idea?

He knows it. He did it. He is the bird, and that his only crime is that he didn't tell anybody. Now, you've short-circuited it one step. Yes, he did and he not-ised it. And he's got it down in the reactive bank and he doesn't even know about it. And he keeps getting these fantastic impulses to steal things.

Now, when you do a Security Check, at the moment you ask it, because it's a specific question that nobody has ever asked him before, he remembers it. And he will tell you about it ordinarily. Now, having gotten that far, you've just gotten that far on your own steam. You've looked at the pc; you looked down here at your paper and find out the next question is "Have you stolen anything?"

All right. You look at this and you say, "All right. Have you stolen anything?"

And the pc says, "Oh, yes. Yes, as a matter of fact, I did. I stole three apples and two bananas and a cartwheel. And I once belonged to the army — enough said — and so forth. Yes, I have. Yeah, that's right. I sure have. All right."

"Good. Thank you." He's answered the question, hasn't he? All right. You're going to ask him again. You say, "Well, have you stolen anything?" in any wording you care to put it.

And he says, "Well, yes. Yes, as a matter of fact, when I was a young kid we stole an automobile and went for a joy ride."

All right. And you say, "Well, all right. Thank you. Good. Now, have you stolen anything?"

And the guy says, "I told you all about it. That's . . . No, there's nothing more."

And you say, "All right. Now, let's just be sure. Now, all right. I'm going to ask you on this now. All right. Have you stolen anything? Oh, I'm afraid there's still a knock there. What else is it? Come on. You can remember it. Come on, what is it now?"

"Well, blessed if I know one. I'm damned if I know. I can't remember anything else that I stole."

"Now, there must have been something There must have been something"

"I did nothing. There isn't anything else I've stolen."

You say, "All right. Well, let's just check it out and make sure we're straight here now. All right. Have you stolen anything in this lifetime?"

No knock.

"Okay. Well you — so you've been a ruddy thief in other lifetimes, but you haven't stolen in this lifetime. So that's fine. That's okay. All right. Now, here's the next question: 'Have you ever buttered any bread?' it says. All right. Now, have you ever buttered — have you ever buttered any bread?"

And the guy says, "Buttered any bread. No. No. Hm-mm. Nope."

And you say, "All right. Let's make sure. Good. Have you ever buttered any — Oh, wait a minute. There's a hell of a knock on this thing. Now look, you can remember that. Come on now."

"Uh, buttered any bread?"

"Yes, that's right. I'll repeat it. Have you buttered any bread? Well, look at that, for God's sakes. Look at it."

So he breaks out a microscope and a telephoto exposure meter and so forth, and he looks around. "Buttered any bre — Oh, no. Oh, no. Well, yes, as a matter of fact, I was a . . . God, you know I'd forgotten this. I was an attendant in a psychiatric ward when I was about twenty-two. I'd forgotten that completely. Yes, and we used to butter bread in there all the time for the insane patients. Yeah, yeah. What do you know?"

And you say, "Well, all right. Okay now. All right. Now, let's just check this one so we can leave it. Have you buttered any bread? All right. Have you buttered any bread? Yeah, well, that's flat. Okay.

"All right. Now, here's the next question. Have you ever been a student?" You understand?

Now look. Look here. This is a different demeanor. This is a different demeanor than the way you're delivering a Security Check. You're busy Security Checking somebody's analytical mind. I'm sure of that, because it's taking you too long, you see?

First thing I found out about this Security Check. You were taking latent reads. The only time you ever say "I'll repeat the auditing question" in a Security Check is when he said "somebody else."

You said, "Have you ever buttered any bread?"

And he said, "Well, my Aunt Gahooseba used . . ."

You say, "I'll repeat the auditing question." Don't even let him finish the sentence. The devil with it. You say, "I'll repeat the auditing question. Have you ever buttered any bread? You."

"Oh, oh, you . . . Well, no. I . . ."

"Well, all right. We'll check it. Good. That's all right. Fine. Here we go." Got the idea?

It's between you and the pc until what signal? There is a signal.

Audience: "No."

"No." That's right. You learned your lesson well. That is the signal. And you'll have nothing to do with an E-Meter until you get that signal.

Male voices: Thank you. Yes.

Nothing to do with it. Put it under your chair. Sit on it. Butter it. Who cares? But don't have anything to do with an E-Meter, because you're cutting comm with the pc. Now, why you got that E-Meter under your nose? I never security checked anybody in my life in this particular fashion, staring at the E-Meter and looking at it suspiciously. "Yes, you criminal. I have you sitting in the chair." I can security check the most unlikely people.

Now, why are you using any Model Session in the Security Check at all?

Well, it's just better. It keeps you from yickety-yaketing, and takes you too far off the line. It actually isn't really a Model Session action. It isn't a Model Session type of action. There's a lot of yickety-yak goes on, on the thing. You can close it and you can bridge and you can use those Model Session factors.

But I get people to talk by persuading them to talk, in an E-Meter. I'm liable to say to somebody, "Now look. You want to know. . . You're afraid to tell me something about this, or I see you're now remembering something about it, and you're apparently afraid to tell me. Why are you afraid to tell me?"

"Well," he'd say, "You might tell somebody else."

I said, "Right. That's right." I said, "I'm going to . . . Soon as you tell me, I'll get an HCO Sec and they'll put it on a telex and they'll send it to all Central Organizations as an Urgent."'

And the guy says, "That's silly, you know?"

"Yes, that's right. It's silly. Now, what have you done?"

"Oh," the guy says, "Oh, well, put in that light, well, actually, I used to kiss goats."

And you say, "All right. You used to kiss goats. Very good. All right. All right. Okay. Now, let's just check out and see if you've remembered everything there is to remember about that, see? All right. What animalism have you practiced with illicit diamond buying?"

Then a guy gets another knock and you say, "Aw! come off of it, you know? Did you — have you remembered this? Do you know this right now? Do you know this all." The attitude is "You couldn't possibly know this and not tell me. And I'm helping you fish it up. And here you are wasting time here by holding... It's silly, you know? This is foolish. Now, come on. You did remember this? You — you now . . ."

"Well, yes, I was embarrassed to tell you."

"Oh, well, all right. So you're so bad off that it embarrasses you to tell an auditor something. All right, now I'm not going to jump on you for that or anything, just give me this dope here. Let's get the show on the road," you see — you know, that kind of thing. That is, if I suspect that he is remembering it now, you see, and then sitting there holding onto it or afraid to tell me. You can ordinarily tell; they start to look hunted, you know?

Well, that's about as far as you ever go in attacking a pc. But just a direct assault on a pc: To pick up that E-Meter, the first time you ask that question, look fixedly at the E-Meter, ask the question in a rather suspicious tone of voice, and so forth. You're being absolutely certain that he's not going to tell you. Well, what are you doing? You're cutting comm with the pc. You are actually encouraging him to withhold.

You might as well say to him, "Now, I know you're going to withhold and you know you're going to withhold, so therefore everybody is going to withhold around here, and therefore we're going to take five times as long to do a Security Check." You see, when you sort it out with this kind of an idea? Of course, he's going to withhold. Even if he knew these things, he wouldn't tell me. I go at an entirely different assumption, because I'm attacking the reactive bank.

I assume that if he remembers it or knows about it, he will tell me at once. And I do everything I can do to promote that frame of mind. It's not just promoting that frame of mind. It's true. And by the time he's asked about the third question, you know, answered about the third question, well, he says, "Ah! This is pretty interesting, you know? I mean pretty, pretty wild. Yeah, you know, I can talk to this guy," and he starts going into session. And here he is. He's in-session.

I ask him the next question, "Have you buttered any bread?" Never occurs to him for a moment to withhold the thing.

He says, "Buttering bread, well, as a matter of fact when we were very young, I — I'd sure hate to have this known."

I say, "Well, it's going to be known. Now go ahead."

And "Ah, well, when we were little children, we used to butter bread, you know, and we'd butter it and butter it, and so forth, and hide it from our mother."

And I say, "All right. Good-o. How do you feel about that now?"

"Aaahh. Pretty grim."

"All right. Good enough. Well, have you buttered any bread?"

"No, I've just told you."

That's it. That's all of it. See, that's "no." You know? Then let's say, "All right, now, let's make sure we've got all of it."

And we check it on the meter. And we're already reading with an advanced sensitivity knob. We ask him with the sensitivity knob advanced, and then we ask him with the sensitivity knob totally increased. No further fall. That's it. We have checked it out. We can leave the question. And it's just a one-two-three-four.

But, it is your role as an auditor to persuade him that he can remember and that he can tell you. And every time you make suspicious actions in the direction of the E-Meter, you invalidate that a little bit. So the less those suspicious actions are, the better off you are.

You sit down. You put the E-Meter down, so forth. It's not an attitude of "Well, we're gonna find out all about it now, because there you are walking around knowing all about these things, and so forth. And that makes you a pretty bad criminal, doesn't it? Hah-ha-ha-ha. Ha-ha-ha-ha.s'

Well, two-way communication goes up the chimney right there. How could it do otherwise? How could it do otherwise? No. You as the auditor can create an atmosphere, not of confidence, but create an atmosphere of communication. Don't create an atmosphere of no-communication.

You don't have to operate like a con man; you don't have to operate like a priest. As a matter of fact, I'm not above throwing all sorts of dunnage into a Security Check on the basis the fellow is looking very, pooff You know, you've just asked him, "Well, have you ever raped a girl?" you know.

"O-o-o-o-oh, yeah."

"Well, all right now, you just remembered something there. Now, what was it?"

"Wah-wah-wah-what. I don't know what I did there. Ughrr-oh-oo-oo-oooo... That's..."

I say, "What the hell is all this about?" I'm not above saying something like this. I go, you know, "What the hell is this about. Do you think I'm a Catholic priest or something? I'm going to make you wear sackcloth and ashes for the rest of your life?"

The guy says, "Oh no. I guess — I guess you're not."

And I say, "This isn't 1620. This is AD 11. All right, now, let's hit this thing hard now. Now, "Have you ever raped a girl?"

"Well . . ."

"Tell me all about it."

"Well, all right." And he tells you all about it. And not because you found it on the E-Meter, but because you just said, "Well, look at them sighs and groans, moans and writhing. And, man, there is something there. And you and me had better get this into view, all the way, and let the turbojet blowers go through the reactive bank, you know?"

Next thing you know, promoted, question after question after question, he is more and more confident and feels more and more confidence in his auditor and feels better and better. And the knowingness is going up in all directions. And the E-Meter is further and further away and is actually only used just to check out the last two checks. And you get so that you'd never find anything on the last two checks. You just never find an additional fall, that's all. He's given the whole thing to you before you ever went near the meter, see.

You, after all, are the auditor. And when you forget that you are the auditor . . . And no matter how marvelous a mechanical contrivance is, when you forget that you yourself are doing the auditing and that you yourself are handling the pc, you get a slowdown right there. It starts to grind, you see?

Now, our next level of wasted motion was, of course, in this thing of latent read and letting the pc wander and so forth, exerting no control over his communication in the session.

You say to him, "Well, have you ever bitten any snakes?"

And he says, "Oh, well, yeah. Once upon a ti - . Yeah, as a matter of fact, my Aunt Grace, she used to bite snakes — used to buy snakes down in the market and she'd bite them. She used to bring them home and bite them. And it horrified me as a small boy. And that's why you're getting a fall on the meter, or would get a fall on the meter, if you were looking at the meter."

And you say, "Whoa now. Whoa, whoa, whoa. Whoa, whoa. Whoa. I asked you if you had bitten any snakes?"

"Oh, oh, me? Yeah, well . . ."

"That's what the meter would be falling on if I were looking at it."

"Oh, well. All right. Well, the hell with it. Yes, all right. I do it all the time. As a matter of fact, I did it last night. Bit one. Bit his head right off. I've got to bite 'em."

And you'd say, "Okay. All right. Now, we'll check this one out. Is there anything more there? Nothing more?" You know? I mean, "Have you ever bitten any snakes?"

"No. That's the only one. That's the only one."

"All right. We'll just check it out on the E-Meter. Have you ever bitten any snakes? Ah, that's all right. Okay. Fine. All right, now let's get on with this thing now. Stop putting on the brakes."

And the guy gets in a frame of mind where he feels perfectly safe, and actually his anxieties in life were borne out of the fact that he doesn't feel so safe. So you bring about a tremendous change in the pc just by this attitude. The attitude alone can bring about a change in a pc.

Use your E-Meter when he says no. Until he says no, leave it alone. Check it out for the advanced read you are already using Check out the question again for the most increased read you can get on the E-Meter and then, if you got nothing then, go on.

But, of course, on the advanced read, not the most extreme read, you check it out "Have you ever bitten any snakes?" And it goes pang! again. Oh, I tell you the amount of disappointment which I can get into my voice is histrionic. I say, "There's a fall here."

Well, he says, "I told you everything I'm . . ."

"Oh, you did. You don't remember this one? Oh, all right. All right. All right. Well now, let's see if we can find it. All right. I'11 help you out. Now, have you ever bitten any snakes?" Bang! "What's that falling on? This lifetime? All right. It's this lifetime. Okay. Come on. Spot it. You can do it. Come on, you can do it."

"Whew! Yes, yes, as a matter of fact, I used to bring snakes in and hide them in the teacher's drawer, and then when she was gone, I'd take them out and bite them. Yeah. all right. Whsoooow."

Say, "Yeah, all right," you say. "Okay. Now, let's check it out. Have you ever bitten any snakes?" Fall. "All right, all right, what's the matter? Are you afraid of this subject or something of this sort?"

"Yes, as a matter of fact. It drives me nuts."

"Well, come on. Remember it. Now, you can do it."

"Oooh. I don't know. I don't remember any more of it."

"All right. I will agree with you. You don't remember any more. Let's see if we can find it. I'll help you out here one way or the other. Now, have you ever bitten any snakes?"

"Oh, it's a movie I saw once. It's a movie. It's a movie I saw once."

"All right. Now, I'm going to repeat the auditing question again. Have you ever bitten any snakes?"

"Yeah. Oh, yeah. There's one. I didn't mention that one."

"All right. Good enough. All right. Now, we're going to check it out." (Hess told you what it is.) And you say, "Have you ever bitten any snakes? Ah, there's no fall on that. Good. Have you ever bitten any snakes?"

"Nope."

"All right. Okay. Good. All right. Let's get on with the next one." Get the idea?

It's only when he says no, you use the E-Meter. And then if you're using the E-Meter and he's still saying no, you assume — not that he's really withholding from you — but you merely assume that he hasn't overwhumped the reactive mind. This disappoints you, you see? That he doesn't just bang like this. And he gets the idea that he should be able to do it. It's most remarkable.

The point is that you can get him in a hopeful frame of mind. I'm maybe not putting this point across too good because I'm not giving you an actual demonstration of this thing. But the point is that his confidence comes up, and his ability to overwhump the bank comes up, and his ability to communicate comes up; therefore, his knowingness keeps coming up. And the Security Check will start showing up on your profiles like mad. And they happen rather rapidly. And after a little while, you'll be saying to him something on the order, "Well, have you ever stolen anything?"

And the fellow says, "Yes. So-and-so, and so-and-so, and so-and-so, name, rank and serial number, and sold it to the pawn shop. And that's it. Bang!"

And you say, "All right. Have you stolen anything else, now?"

"No."

You check it out. It'll be blank. His "noes" will be followed by a blank. His "noes" are not followed by a reaction.

Early in the game, yes, his "noes" will be followed by a reaction on the meter, and you'll have to turn around to him and say, "Remember it. Think about it." On the sort of an attitude of mind of "You can do this. It is possible for you to do this. I know that you can do this."

And he thinks, "I'm doing something. Well, yes, I am. I'm remembering something. What do you know! Yes, I am. And I can do it. What do you know!" I'm not putting any hypnotic charm on him, because what I'm putting on him is the fact that I've demonstrated conclusively to him that he could by just insisting that he did. It's like getting an auditing command followed. The auditing command you're kind of running is "Recall all your overts and withholds. Thank you." And after a while, why, they just go off like a streak of light. And it'll be very seldom that you ever find a knock on the meter after you've asked him to tell all. Then you can resort to the meter. And you say, "Well, have you ever been a member in an armed force?" you know.

And he says, "No. No."

And you get down to a point where you get much more rapid agreement amongst, the auditor. . . And this is when you leave a question. When you have total agreement on "no." It's an agreement. The auditor observes it; the E-Meter observes that it's no; the pc observes that it's no, and the reactive bank doesn't churn anyone up, and so it agrees that it's no. See, and everything is in agreement. There is a no. And you're promoting agreement like mad all over the place, you see? Instead of the disagreement!

The disagreement which you're eliciting is when you sit down and look at the meter and you say to the meter — to the meter — you say exclusively, "Well, have you ever bitten any bread?"

And you know the pc knows this, but is only unwilling to tell you. And you're going to sniff him out somehow. You're going to catch him off base. And the whole thing is being conducted in a sort of a paranoid atmosphere of supersuspicion, you see? It does him good in spite of all this, you see? It's just slow. That's all. It's just slow.

You can do Security Checks all backwards and do them all on the meter and stare at nothing but the meter and never listen to what the pc says and go out of communication with him. And you can still get away with it, probably, and you can still get the Security Check system working. And you can still get an advance with the pc, but at what time ratio? Now, we're just talking about time ratio. And that's all I'm trying to teach you these days.

All right. You can build up something else that gives an entirely different time ratio. And that is when you ask the pc, you ask him as a friend and with the encouragement that he probably can remember it. If he has done it, he's certainly going to remember it, and then if he has done that, he is certainly going to tell you. There is — no other thought ever enters your mind than that this is going to happen. And you read him the question and only when he says "no," in one time or another, do you check the thing out on the meter. And then when you finally have checked it out on the meter, you got four things in agreement: the auditor, the pc, the E-Meter and the reactive bank. They're all in agreement that it is "no." All right, then you go on to the next question.

And you can do that with rather great rapidity because, as I say, he will keep remembering them faster and faster. It isn't that you're — you see — it looks a different way. It looks like his confidence in you is increasing, so therefore he can tell you. That is not what's happening. What's happening is he is able, better and better and better, to overwhump his reactive bank and his withholds, and stare them right in the teeth and confront it and own right up to them. And when he starts doing that more and more rapidly, he of course is taking more and more responsibility, and you'll find these things are really blowing. He doesn't creep out of a session and feel like a cur dog and so on. He feels good about it, you know?

And you get him back in the session again, and you get that confidence inspired once more. It's really rolling: It's just a question, he tells you all, you check it out; it's a question, he tells you all, you check it out; it's a question, he tells you all, you check it out. And actually, it's just more and more easy for him to do this. And therefore, it's easier and easier to conduct the Security Check.

And you'll find out that if it's conducted the way I'm trying to outline to you here, that you will get forty or fifty times the number of withholds off the case. Oh, you mean you get more off the case? You said it! You get more. Then he blows it faster, and it takes less time to get the more. Can you see that?

Well, what are you doing? Slowing it down, see? And the only way you can slow it down is be sure he won't tell you; be certain that it is the pc who is withholding it from you; be absolutely certain that it's only through the greatest of chicanery that you will eventually be able to trap him into a point where he has to run up a white flag and surrender with sword hilts reversed, you see? And say, "Well, all right, I've had a game with you and so forth and I give up now, and you've won the game." Now look. That isn't the attitude which you're trying to promote at all.

The other attitude is the one you're trying to promote, which is, "You too can remember your overts. You can do it. You can do it. And there they are and — uh-huh. All right. That was pretty good."

And you know, it is all in an understanding of exactly what's happening. Now, you got subjective reality on this, all of you. All of you right here at this particular instant undoubtedly have felt tortured at one time or another during a Security Check. You know? You were perfectly willing to tell, but the auditor didn't seem to be willing to listen. Or yourself couldn't quite put your finger on it, and you were trying hard, and the auditor seemed to blame you for not being able to put your finger on it, you know?

And the auditor was blaming you, but you were trying to remember, and you couldn't quite get it untangled, and the auditor gave you no help. Have you ever been in that situation in a Security Check? The auditor gave you no help to remember. That's because he's assuming. The auditor has assumed at that point that you remembered, but that you were just being mean.

So this is the assumption of a games condition in auditing, see? Don't ever assume a games condition in auditing Never assume a games condition if you don't want one. You can materialize them left and right. You can materialize all kinds of games conditions. You can materialize more ARC breaks than you can shake a stick at.

Now, auditing is as workable as the rudiments are in. Well, what about this? Isn't this a better way to establish the rudiments during a Security Check than going over them with an advanced sensitivity reading and plucking them all to pieces; and particularly in Routine 1 when you're not supposed to be running verbal processes beyond a Security Check on somebody, trying to clear up his whole case by running rudiments and all this sort of thing. Don't you think that it's pretty apparent that these rudiments will just get ridden roughshod into the situation?

I have to confess to you that rudiments go out to the degree that auditing skill is out. And as auditing skill comes in, the rudiments come in. And you take a guy who has to have lots of havingness run on him, he generally is being audited by somebody who's audited him a bit roughly, you see? There's something going on here which isn't quite a good agreement, you see? So the rudiments are sort of perpetually out.

Well, if you can see that a profile can be held up and made absolutely static by a present time problem; if it can be reduced by an ARC break — if these two things are continuously present — naturally the case won't advance very well, will it? All right. So the best thing you can do is to create the operating atmosphere in which these things can't happen.

Now, if you are suspicious of the pc, continuously suspicious of the pc, they will happen because the pc isn't being bolstered by the auditor's confidence or the auditor's attack on the pc's reactive mind, you see? The pc isn't bolstered by it. The pc is just drifting.

Now, you see how you could really speed one of these things up? I'm sure you saw it earlier today, and I'm already going over ground which Mary Sue has already very, very well covered with you.

Perhaps it's a bit of an invalidation to go over it again, but I want you to see it in this operating atmosphere, not as a mechanical thing but as a created atmosphere that an auditor can create in a Security Check. And it's the basis of creation is simply: "Well, there you are and you've got a lot of these things occluded, and you can't remember them, and we're going to find them, and we're going to ventilate them, and you're going to feel a lot better.

And after you've answered a few questions, then you too will be sure that you can remember the remainder very easily."

And the guy, you know — this kind of an operating atmosphere — he, "Oh, yeah. Yeah." Well, he's remembering faster and faster, and so forth. And he tells you once in a while, "I don't know if I want to go on with this. This is remembering too fast."

"You know. Well, come off of it. You can face up to these things. Have you ever faced up to 'em before?"

"Well, yes, yes. Yeah, I've faced up to 'em before. Must have faced up to them before. I did 'em."

„All right. Face up to them again! All right. Here's the next question."

"Did I face up to them? Hnzm-mm. Heh! I can do that." You know, bang!

And he does.

Can you get some concept of the velocity involved? That is to say the speed of advance — of the increased speed of advance — that you can do with just this single factor. Hm? Do you see that that single factor injected into Security Checking could enormously increase your speed of advance, huh?

You set yourself up as somebody that people cannot help talking to; you set yourself up as somebody in whom people have confidence; you set yourself up as somebody who can be confided in, and you do a fantabulous Security Check.

You set up yourself as a cop who is going to sniff out the crime in spite of everybody preventing you from doing it - heh-heh-heh-heh! rrreh-heh-heh and you'll have to sniff out the crime.

I'll tell you. It's a direct test of how good an auditor can do this, how many times he has to resort to the E-Meter to get it all. That's a direct test. The more often an auditor has to resort to an E-Meter to pull the teeth of withholds, the less he is using this. So you yourself have a good test that you can use while Security Checking. If you're finding you have to resort to the E-Meter, resort to the E-Meter, resort to the E-Meter, you know? And, "Did you do it?" And you get another fall. And you have to clear that. And you get another fall. And you have to clear that, and so on. You have to assume that you don't have the guy's confidence, that's all. You don't have this pc's confidence. That's what you have to assume. That's the first thing you should assume. That's the time for a heart-to-heart talk — time for one of these nice fireside chats.

You say, ''Well, what'd be the liabilities of telling me about these things?,,

"Ohhhh.,,

You'll be told. You'll be told why you didn't — weren't easily able to bring about this atmosphere of confidence. Now having brought it about, get subjective reality on this, you know? Having brought about a better atmosphere of confidence, trust and communication with the pc, look at the speed with which the Security Check goes and how seldom you have to check against the E-Meter.

Well, what is this? It isn't the pc has become more willing to tell you those things which he himself was knowingly hiding. I'll tell you he doesn't know these things. You've given him enough horsepower now, see, that he just goes into the bank one way or the other, and the fur flies. He remembers this, and he remembers that, and he remembers something else, and there it is, and bang! bang! Oh, yes, he can attack that. Yeah, he can overcome that. After a while, he's saying sort of ''Aah, bring on your reactive banks. Who cares? I can lick them!,, Got the idea?

That's the way the first clearing was done, was in that operating atmosphere. Well worth remembering that there was an operating atmosphere that had to do with that. It was simply increasing somebody's confidence over his bank, and increasing his confidence over his bank and increasing his confidence over his bank, and they go Clear — not by running this or that or getting mechanical. They will go Clear, if you just increase their confidence enough over their ability to knock out the bank. Have I made my point?

All right. Well, I hope it's of some help to you.

Thank you.