When doingan evaluation, one can become far too fixated on outpoints and miss the real reason one is doing an evaluation in the first place.
To handle this, it is proper form to write up an evaluation so as to keep in view the reason one is doing one.
This is accomplished by using this form
The whole of it should concern itself with the same general scene, the same subject matter. This is known as CONSISTENCY. One does not have a situation about books, data about bicycles, stats of another person, a WHY about another area, a different subject for ideal scene and handling for another activity.
The situation, whether good or bad, must be about a certain subject, person or area, the data must be about the same, the stats are of that same thing, the WHY relates to that same thing, the ideal scene is about the scene of that same thing and the handling handles that thing and especially is regulated by that Why.
A proper evaluation is all of a piece.
First, to do an evaluation, some situation must have come to notice. There is a report or observation that is out of the ordinary.
This "coming to notice" occurs on any line. Usually it is fairly major, affecting a large portion of the area, but it can be minor.
So OBSERVATION in general must be continuous for situations to be noted.
To just note a situation and act on it is out of sequence as it omits evaluation. You can be elated or shocked uselessly by noting a situation and then not doing any evaluation.
It is the hallmark of a rank amateur or idiot to act on reports without any evaluation.
So, the first step is noting, from general alertness, a situation exists.
A situation is defined as a not expected state of affairs. It is either very good or it is very bad.
If it is very good it must be evaluated and a Why found so one can even upgrade an ideal scene.
If it is very bad, it must be evaluated and a Why found so that it can be handled to more closely approach the ideal scene.
Data is the information one has received that alerts one to the situation.
Intelligence systems use various (mainly faulty) methods of "evaluating" data so as to "confirm it." They do this uniformly from reports. No matter how many reports one may see there is always a question as to their truth. Intelligence chiefs have started most wars (US vs. Germany 1917) or failed to start them in time (US vs. Japan 1936) by depending on "authoritative sources," "skilled observers," "valid documents" and other confetti they class as "reports" or "documents."
As noted above, the "raw document" or "raw materials" as they are called have led, when accepted, to the most terrifying catastrophes. British Admiral Hall, without permission of the British government, leaked the famous "Zimmerman telegram" to US President Wilson and stampeded the US into World War 1. The alleged German "instructions" to their US Ambassador "intercepted" by Hall were passed on with confidence tricks and President Wilson, elected to keep the US out of the war, being no great evaluator, dived overboard on one flimsy questionable report and carried America into the disaster of two world wars and a communist supremacy.
The US was lulled by false Japanese assurances and false data on the smallness of Japanese armaments and considered the country no danger. The true situation would have led to a US declaration of war in 1936! Before Japan could sink the whole Pacific fleet in one raid and cause 4 1/2 years of war and open all of China to communist supremacy.
These are just a couple of the thousands of disasters in international affairs brought about by a pathetic reliance on reports or documents.
If you knew the game well, with a half a dozen agents and a document factory, you could have half the countries of the planet in turmoil. Because they rely on reports and "authoritative sources" and "expert opinion" instead of data as viewed in this Data Series.
If one does not court disaster and failures one does NOT rely on reports, but an absence of reports or a volume of reports carefully surveyed for outpoints and counted.
To do this one must be VERY skilled at spotting outpoints. Most people confuse simple errors with actual outpoints.
You can get so good at this you can recognize outpoints and pluspoints at a fast glance over reports.
Essentially, "data" regarded from the angle of outpoints is a lack of consistency. "Our Div 2 is doing very well" doesn't go with gross income $2.
This gives you a guideline, the "string to pull" (see investigation checksheet on following down things you just don't understand, the first emergence of the Data Series).
So the DATA you give is not a lot of reports. It is a brief summary of the "strings pulled" on the outpoint or pluspoint route to finally get the Why.
Example: (from a situation where an org was going broke) "The sign-ups reported for service and new names to Central Files were both high yet gross income was down. An investigation of the service area showed no backlogs and no new customers with the staff idle. Tech Services was fully staffed. Examining complement showed no one in the Department of Income. People were signed up but there was no one to receive the money." The WHY of course was a wrong complement particularly NO CASHIER and an Executive Director neglecting his duties.
Example: (on a situation of a stat soaring) "The Promo Dept had very down stats with no promo going out. Bulk mail was low. Div 6 was idle, yet the GI was soaring. Nothing in the org could be found to account for it. Investigation of what promo incoming public had, showed that the promo was coming from a lower level org promoting itself as a route to upper level services." The WHY of course was an effective promo campaign being run OUTSIDE the org. And one could bolster that up and get theorg active too.
DATA, then, is the Sherlock Holming of the trail that gave the WHY. It at once reflects the command the evaluator has of the DATA SERIES. And his own cleverness.
Sometimes they come in a sudden blue flash a yard long, a piece of insight into what MUST be going on if these outpoints add up this way. Rapid investigation of further data on this trail proves or disproves the flash of insight. One does NOT run on insight alone (or crystal balls).
To one not trained and practiced in evaluation the finding of a REAL WHY may look as mysterious as an airplane to an aborigine.
It is a fact that people who do not understand evaluation can get the idea that management acts on personalities or whims or that management has spies everywhere to know that the Distribution Secretary never came to work.
To the expert it is easy. To the ignorant it looks very supernatural.
It is the TRAIL followed that counts.
This is what is required under "DATA."
Situations and DATA trails are supported by statistics.
Where statistics are not in numeral form this may be harder. Where they are outright lies, this is an outpoint itself.
A person or nation without any statistic may be a puzzle at first but statistical approximations can exist and be valid.
Statistics of CIA would be very hard to dig up. They don't even let the US Congress in on it. But the deteriorating overseas influence of the US would show that CIA was not batting any high average and that its data fed to policy-makers (its avowed purpose) might well be false or misleading causing policy errors that cause a deteriorating scene.
So statistics can be estimated by the scene itself even when absent in numerical form.
England has lost its whole empire in a quarter of a century, without a single defeat in war. This gives an adequate statistic for the government's good sense or lack of it. It is at this writing losing even parts of the homeland and is itself joining what might be called the Fourth Reich and so will soon cease to exist as a political sovereignty. This statistic can even be drawn as a dive-bombing down curve.
A deckhand's statistic may not exist on a chart but the areas he tends do exist for view.
One either has a numerical statistic or a direct observation. One can use both.
I once answered the question, "Why are paid completions high and gross income low?" by finding that the "paid" completions stats were false.
So one statistic can be compared to another.
Three or more stats can be compared to each other and often lead directly to a WHY.
The main point is DON'T ACT WITHOUT STATISTICAL DATA.
After a fine data analysis, one may well find the stats are quite normal and there is NO situation.
One may have a great PR PR PR data analysis and collide with statistics you'd need a submarine to read.
And one may have data that says the whole staff of Keokuk should be shot without waiting for dawn and then discover that, by stats, they're doing great.
And one can also do a data analysis that shows somebody should be commended and prove it by stats and then discover belatedly the stats are false and the guy should have been shot.
However, if one looks at all available stats after doing a data analysis one may find they look good at a glance but are sour as green apples. One could see a high lot of stats, GI, etc., and then see a cost stat that shows someone is making $2 million at a cost of $4 million and that the place is going straight into the garbage can.
DO NOT give a Why or recommend handling without inspecting the actual stats.
And DO NOT be thrown off a situation you are sure exists without looking at ALL the stats. (Example: High hour interns' stats throw one off interfering until one sees NO interns graduating and NO programs completed by them.)
This is the jewel in the crown, the main dish at dinner, the gold mine in the towering mountains of mystery.
A real WHY must lead to a bettering of the existing scene or (in the case of a wonderful new scene) maintaining it as a new ideal scene.
Therefore the WHY must be something you can do something about. (See THE WHY IS GOD policy letter.)
Thus the WHY is limited by what you can control. It is NEVER that other division or top management or the bumps on the moon.
Even if all this were true, the WHY must be something which YOU CAN DO SOMETHING ABOUT YOURSELF FROM YOUR LEVEL OF AUTHORITY OR INITIATIVE that will lead to THE IMPROVEMENT OF A POOR EXISTING SCENE TOWARD THE IDEAL SCENE.
The WHY is a special thing then. It is a key that opens the door to effective improvement.
It is not a prejudice or a good idea. It is where all the analysis led.
And a REAL Why when used and handled and acted upon is like a magic carpet. The scene at once becomes potentially better or gets maintained.
"Acting on a wrong Why" is the stuff of which coffins are made.
No matter how brilliant the program that follows, there it is, the same old mud.
Wrong Whys work people half to death handling a program which will lay ostrich eggs and rotten ones at that.
It will cost money and time that can't be afforded easily.
It will distract from the real tiger in the woods and let him roar and eat up the goats while everyone is off chasing the ghosts which "really were the cause of it all."
Wrong Whys are the tombstones of all great civilizations and unless someone gears up the think will be the mausoleum of this one.
Do not think you won't get them. It takes 28,000 casualties in battle, they say, to make a major general. Well it may take a few wrong Whys to make an evaluator.
The evaluator who has done the evaluation is of course responsible for it being correctly done and leading to the right conclusion and verified by stats to give the correct real WHY.
And the real ones are often too incredible to have been arrived at in any other way. Or they are so obvious no one noticed.
In one instance Whys were found by experts for six months on a certain course without improving the flagrantly bad situation but actually messing it up more until a huge real Why jumped out (the students had never been trained on earlier levels) and the situation began to improve.
Using one Why for all situations can also occur and fads of Whys are common. True, a Why often applies elsewhere. That's what gives us technology including policy. But in any area of operation where a situation is very abnormal the Why is likely to be very peculiar and too off the ordinary to be grasped at once.
There can be an infinity of wrongnesses around just one rightness. Thus there can be an infinity of wrong Whys possible with just one real Why that will open the door.
For the real Why does open the door. With it on a good situation one can maintain it and with a bad situation one can improve it.
Thus the REAL WHY is the vital arrival point to which evaluation leads.
If a bad situation is a departure from the ideal scene and if a good situation is attaining it or exceeding it, then the crux of any evaluation is THE IDEAL SCENE for the area one is evaluating.
Viewpoint has a lot to do with the ideal scene.
To Russia a collapsed America is the ideal scene. To America a collapsed Russia is an ideal scene.
To some have-not nations both Russia and the US competing at vast expense for the favor of a coy petty ruler is the ideal scene to that ruler.
To most other parts of the world both these major countries interested only in their own affairs would be an ideal scene.
So, with viewpoint the ideal scene can be "bad" or "good."
The ideal scene is not necessarily big and broad. An intelligence evaluator that gave the ideal scene as "a defeated enemy" on every evaluation would be very inexpert.
By CONSISTENCY the ideal scene must be one for that portion of an activity for which one is trying to find the Why.
Example: (Situation: renewed activity on a front held by one platoon. Evaluation: No other points along the lines are active and a tank road leads toward the front where the activity is. WHY: area being prepared for a tank breakout.) IDEAL SCENE: an uninhabitable area in front of the platoon. (Which could be done with napalm as there is a wood there and a heavy crossfire maintained and a renewed supply of bazookas for the platoon if the napalm didn't work.)
Example: (Situation: a lot of silence from Plant 22. Evaluation: no trucks arriving with materials, no raw materials being sent by outside suppliers, suppliers irate. WHY: The accounting office forgot to pay the raw materials bill and the suppliers held up all further supplies.) THE IDEAL SCENE: high credit rating and good accounts PR established with all creditors. (And handling would include a recommendation for an evaluation of the accounting office as to why it forgot and why there is no high credit PR with a new ideal scene for that accounting office, which might be a wholly different thing: IDEAL SCENE: an accounting office that enforces income greater than outgo.)
By giving the IDEAL SCENE for every situation, the evaluator is not led into a fatal contempt for the competence of all work actually being done.
The ideal scene clarifies for one and all whither we are going.
But even more important, the evaluation that includes an ideal scene postulates a win from the viewpoint of those for whom it is being done or for one's activities.
Sometimes when one gets to the ideal scene and writes it down he finds his Why won't really lead to it, in which case he must get another Why or familiarize himself with the scene in general to find out what he is trying to send where.
In the case of an abnormally good situation one finds he has exceeded what was formerly thought to be the ideal scene and must state a new one entirely with the WHY concerned with how to maintain it.
Anyone reading a full evaluation in proper form can better estimate whether the WHY and handling are workable if the IDEAL SCENE is there. And sometimes it will be found that the evaluator is trying to do something else entirely than what everyone else thinks is a correct attainment.
Thus it is a very healthy thing to include the ideal scene. It serves as a discipline and incentive for the evaluator and those executing the program.
Handling must be CONSISTENT with the situation, the evaluation, the Why and the ideal scene.
Handling must be WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES of those who will do the actions.
Handling must be WITHIN THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE.
Handling quite often but not always requires a BRIGHT IDEA. It is peculiarly true that the less the resources available the brighter the idea required to attain effective handling.
Handling must be SUPERVISED by one person who acts as a coordinator of the program and a checker-offer and debug expert.
And last but most important handling must be EFFECTIVE AND FINAL.
The steps of handling are in program form. They are numbered 1-2-3, etc. Or A-B-C, etc.
They can be in the sequence they will be done but this is mostly important when one person or one team is going to do the whole thing step by step.
These steps are called TARGETS.
Each part of the program (each TARGET) is assigned to someone to do or to get done.
Care must be taken not to overload persons already loaded and where this occurs
one appoints a special personnel or mission for that specific target.
The supervision must see that each target gets fully done and no targets not-done and no targets half-done.
It is up to supervision to keep track of all completions on a MASTER sheet.
Supervision debugs those targets that bog or lag by finding in them a Why, which may mean a rapid evaluation of that target to rephrase it or get it clarified without altering its intended accomplishment.
Supervision can reassign a target.
It is expected that any complex or extensive target will have a PROJECT written for it by the person to whom it is assigned if not by the originator.
By completing this project the target is DONE.
Often these projects have to be passed upon by a senior before being begun.
When the MASTER sheet shows all targets DONE (not not-done and not half-done and not falsely reported) full situation handling can be expected.
When the supervisor reports all targets done, it is in the hands of fate whether the situation will now be progressed toward or attain the ideal scene.
The accuracy of the data, the skill of the evaluator, the correctness of the WHY, the competence of the supervisor and the skill of those executing the targets and the willingness of those receiving the effects of all this activity (their human emotion and reaction) determine whether this evaluation approaches or attains the ideal scene.
All such evaluations should be REVIEWED as soon as the actions have had time to take effect.
An idiot optimism can suppose all is well and that it is needless to review.
But if this WHY was wrong then the situation will deteriorate and a worsening situation will be apparent.
Thus a sharp watch has to be set. No thirst for "always being right" or arrogance about never being wrong must prevent an honest review.
WAS the ideal scene approached or attained?
Or was it a wrong Why and now is all Hades breaking loose?
Now we don't have just renewed insistence that the WHY was right and that the program must go in in spite of all.
We have a wrong Why.
IT WILL BE FOUND THAT WHERE YOU HAVE A REAL WHY PEOPLE WILL COOPERATE ALL OVER THE SCENE.
The only EXCEPTION is where there are traitors around. But this is an easy explanation, too often bought to excuse wrong Whys.
The Germans, when they found in World War II, how ineffective the Italian intelligence service was, couldn't believe it, tried to improve it, became convinced they were traitors, probably shot them in scores and took the service over themselves. And lost Italy even more rapidly. Whatever the right Why was, the Germans had the wrong one. And so does any executive who has to shoot everybody - he just can't find the right Whys.
It is NO disgrace to find a wrong Why. It is only a disgrace not to keep trying on and on until one does find it. Then the clouds open, the sun shines, the birds pour out their souls in purest melody and the ideal scene is approached or reached.
So REVIEW is damnably important.
Situations have to be handled very fast.
And reviews have to be as quick as possible after effect can occur.
So here you have the whole view.
The keynotes are OBSERVE, EVALUATE, PROGRAM, SUPERVISE and REVIEW.
The heart of Observe is accuracy.
The heart of Evaluate is a cool, cold knowledge of the Data Series.
The heart of Program is knowing the scene.
The heart of Supervise is getting it FULLY done.
The heart of Review is HUMILITY.
If you cannot roll all this off rapidly then misunderstood words in this series are in the way. Or one is battling with some outpoint in his own life.
The Data Series is for USE.
It works because it has unlocked logic.
In management one is very fortunate since he can program and handle.
In intelligence one is less fortunate as his handling can only be suggested and many an intelligence officer has watched a useless Battle of the Bulge after he told them all about it and "they" had other ideas. But the Data Series works in intelligence as well.
Data analysis was not developed in a professorial out of a lost-to-the-world tower. It was evolved by attempting to explain logic, then was developed on one of the hottest cross-fire but successful evaluation posts on the planet against a background of blood, sweat and tears war intelligence experience.
So it is itself REAL.
The key to it is handling DATA.
So here it is.
I do sincerely hope it serves you in helping to attain your ideal scene.